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Abstract 
Research on financial accountability in local government administration has over the years focused mainly on 
traditional accountability mechanisms such as analysis of auditor’s report, annual financial statements or reports, and 
adherence to financial regulations among others. This research orientation often tends to focus more on the actions 
than the actors in the financial management process. Given that financial accountability is the action of actors, this 
paper focuses on the ´´who´´ aspect of financial accountability in local government administration. Using a concept 
of financial responsibility charting, the study sought to assess the level of understanding of core staff and Assembly 
members of the Asante Akim South District Assembly in Ghana on basic financial roles or responsibilities of actors 
involved in local government financial administration. The study found that not all the core staff of the Asante Akim 
South District Assembly knows all the specific financial roles or responsibilities of their colleagues in the financial 
management chain. The study also found that, the Assembly members who are supposed to hold the officials of the 
Assembly accountable; do not have a fair understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the core staff in the 
financial management chain. The paper concludes that until efforts are made to whip up the interest of people, 
especially the Assembly members on the need to be abreast with financial responsibility charting, the quest for 
transparency and accountability in local government financial administration would remain a mirage.  
Keywords: Local government, revenue, management, responsibility charting, accountability 
 
1. Introduction 
Decentralisation has been pursued with the aim of bringing governance and development decision-making closer to 
the ordinary citizen at the sub-national level. The devolution of power, authority and resources to sub-national 
entities is intended to make governance more responsive to the needs of the people. It is also intended to make 
governments more accountable to the local people, (Kokor, 2001; Diaw, 1997; Yilmaz, et al, 2008; Ahwoi, 2010). 
Local government authorities are expected to promote not only political participation in decision-making, they also 
have the responsibility of advancing socio-economic development to local residents. Local residents in Ghana often 
look up to District Assemblies to promote socio-economic development in their respective localities. This 
developmental task of the District Assemblies requires money. As Yilmaz, et al, (2008) point out, the ability of local 
governments to effectively carry out their functions is largely dependent on the degree of fiscal or financial 
decentralisation. In view of this developmental task of the District Assemblies and its concomitant financial demand, 
central governments in most countries continue to transfer financial resources to them to enable them discharge their 
duties. In addition to the central government transfers, the District Assemblies have also been given the legal 
mandate to mobilise revenue within their localities. 
In order to ensure value for money, the process of fiscal decentralisation has been linked to the subject of 
accountability. It is being argued that fiscal decentralisation would not make the desire impact if local government 
authorities do not account for these financial resources. The success and sustainability of fiscal or financial 
decentralisation would largely depend on the capacity of local governments to institute measures to effectively 
manage these revenues, (Yilmaz, et al (2008). Promoting fiscal or financial accountability in local governments does 
not only lie on ensuring that revenues are appropriated legally, but by guaranteeing an institutional arrangement 
where roles and responsibilities of those involved in financial management are clarified to all. According to the 
“agency logic, mechanisms must be put in place to control self-interested managers and hold them accountable for 
their actions” Bednar (2012: 133). The subject of accountability is essentially a governance matter. As Sloan (2001: 
336) notes, “without governance problems, the role of financial accountability would be reduced to providing 
investors with the risk and return information required to facilitate the optimal portfolio allocation decision”. 
Financial accountability in local government administration certainly goes beyond the provision of financial 
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statements. As a governance matter, there is an element of role expectation and role behaviour in financial 
accountability. As far as financial management is concerned, a lot is expected from the conduct of schedule financial 
officers beyond the issuance of financial statements. 
Accountability in the financial management of any district must be held in high esteem if the district is expected to 
develop. This role is nonetheless, generally seen as the sole responsibility of the District Assembly core staff. But 
ensuring financial accountability in the District Assemblies is not the duty of the core staff alone. The Assembly 
members, who are the representatives of the local people, have to be actively involved. In fact, it is the responsibility 
of the Assembly members to hold officials of the District Assemblies accountable on the management of the 
Districts’ financial resources. This requires that the Assembly members have deeper understanding financial issues 
and the roles or responsibilities of officers associated with these issues in order to hold the right officials accountable. 
This study thus sought to assess the understanding of the District Assembly core staff and the Assembly Members on 
the roles and responsibilities of public officials and units in the financial management process. This would help us 
better understand how both officials and Assembly Members of District Assemblies in Ghana are involved or 
concerned with ensuring financial accountability in the Districts, by way of role monitoring or performance 
evaluation. 
 
2. Methodology 
The data for this paper is derived from data obtained from a wider research that assessed the Asante Akim South 
District Assembly´s revenue mobilisation and management efforts. The data for this paper focused on assessing the 
Assembly´s knowledge on financial responsibility charting and its implications for revenue management or financial 
accountability. 
 
2.1 Background of Study District 
The Asante Akim South District Assembly is located in the Ashanti Region of Ghana. The district was created 
following the implementation of a comprehensive decentralisation programme by the Government of Ghana in 1988. 
It has Juaso as the district capital, where the principal offices of the Assembly are located. The Asante Akim South 
District occupies a total land area of 1,217 square kilometres. According to the 2000 Population and Housing Census 
Report, the Asante Akim South District has a population of 96,868 people, with a population density of 78 persons 
per square kilometres. The district lies within the semi-deciduous forest zone of Ghana, and abounds in a number of 
economic tree species, such as mahogany, wawa, odum and teak; which are exploited to feed the local wood industry 
and for exports. The district is largely rural, with agriculture as the dominant economic activity in the area. It is 
estimated that the agricultural sector employs about 72% of the active labour force in the district. The main crops 
grown in the district are cocoa, cassava, maize, plantain and oil palm. The industrial sector in the district employs 
about 6% of the active labour force, and is mainly characterized by food processing, alcohol distilling and wood 
based industries.  Administratively, the District Assembly is the highest political authority in the area. In 
furtherance the decentralisation programme, the Asante Akim South District is divided into two town councils, and 
nine area councils. 
 
2.2 Methods 
The target respondents of this research were the District Assembly core staff and the Assembly members. The core 
staff here refers to the key administrative staff of the District Assembly. Among the core staff selected for the 
research include the District Coordinating Director, the District Finance Officer, the District Budget Officer, the 
District Planning Officer, and the District Internal Auditor. These respondents were purposively selected. They are 
the main officials who perform the core functions that constituted the checklist for the financial responsibility chart. 
The study was intended to assess their knowledge or understanding of each other roles or responsibilities in the 
financial management chain. 
The Assembly members constitute the second category of respondents for the study. In Ghana’s local government 
administration, the Assembly members constitute the legislative arm of the District Assembly. The Assembly 
members were selected for this study for two main reasons. First, they have roles and responsibilities in the district 
financial management chain. Second, as representatives of the local people, they are expected to hold the political 
and administrative staff of the District Assembly accountable. It is thus expected that the Assembly members are 
abreast with roles and responsibilities associated with financial management in the District Assembly set-up. The 
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Assembly is made up of sixty (60) Assembly Members – forty-two (42) elected members and eighteen (18) 
appointed by the President of the Republic of Ghana in consultation with local chiefs in the district. Out of the sixty 
Assembly members, forty-six of them willingly filled and returned the interview checklist.  
A checklist containing the financial roles or responsibilities was designed and used as the main data collection 
instrument. Respondents were asked to independently filled in the schedule officers they think are to perform each 
specific tasks listed in the checklist. I chose a day where the Assembly had a meeting. During a break time, the 
checklists were distributed to the Assembly members, who filled and returned it before going home. All checklists 
were filled and returned the same day. The checklists were collected and processed manually. The figures derived 
were converted into percentages to ensure uniformity between the smaller group of respondents, (core staff), and 
larger group (Assembly members). The descriptive statistics thus formed the basis of analysis.  
 
3. Decentralisation and Local Governance 
Decentralisation has become a household word. In many developing countries, the concept of decentralisation was 
widely promoted alongside neoliberal economic policies like the structural adjustment programmes in the 1980s. The 
concept of decentralisation has since travelled to almost all parts of the world. Gravingholt et al (2006: 22) notes that 
decentralisation efforts rank high on the political agenda of many developing countries. Decentralisation as a 
political agenda is being linked to democratisation. In the view of Gravingholt et al (2006: 22), these reforms aim at 
enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of local administration in public service provision by bringing 
decision-making processes and responsibilities closer to the people. Jutting et al (2005: 625) broadly defined 
decentralisation as “embracing the transfer of power and resources from higher tiers to lower tiers of government”.  
There are different forms of decentralisation, but distinction is usually made between devolution and 
de-concentration. Blair (2000) notes “decentralisation involves both de-concentration, in which local bodies are 
asked (or, more appropriately, instructed) to assume responsibilities that have traditionally been carried out by 
central line agencies; and devolution, in which local bodies are granted the political and financial authority to 
undertake these duties”, (cited in Johnson, 2001: 523). The aim of de-concentration according to the OECD (2001: 
16) has been to increase the local input to policy design in order to increase policy efficiency, while the aim of 
devolution is to increase policy effectiveness by developing entirely new policies as well as to improve governance 
by bringing decision-making closer to the people affected. These discussions highlight the three key elements of 
devolution – transfer of power, authority and resources to lower levels of government. 
Devolution is usually seen as the best and true form of decentralisation as it involves the real transfer of power and 
authority to sub-national structures. The OECD (2001: 16) defines devolution as “a process of transfer of powers 
between central, nation-state, government and lower levels of government, principally operating at city and region 
level”. Devolution is usually advocated because of the perceived inefficiencies associated with most central 
governments. According to Bardhan (1997: 45), “the centralised state has lost a great deal of legitimacy owing to its 
many failures, and decentralization is often suggested and implemented as a way of reducing the role of the state”. 
The OECD (2001: 17) also argues that by devolving appropriate powers to city and region level, decisions can be 
rendered more responsive to the needs and preferences of local people, democracy can be strengthened and the 
effectiveness of the public sector can be improved by helping to ensure that the right public services are provided in 
the right way. These discussions clearly show that there has been the need for the devolution of power, authority and 
resources to lower levels of government to perform certain developmental functions. As the OECD (2001: 15) points 
out “devolution opens up new possibilities and challenges for economic development policymakers because it gives 
them the capacity to develop their own distinctive approaches to economic development and to develop new 
institutional relationships suited to their own city or region”. Devolution has resulted in the creation of sub-national 
structures charged with the responsibility of promoting democratic decision making and local development. 
Decentralisation is not designed to achieve a political objective alone; it also has socio-economic functions. 
Decentralised entities like District Assemblies in Ghana are expected to promote socio-economic development at the 
sub-national level. As Alburquerque (2004: 158) points out “the restoration of democracy at the municipal and the 
local level in general has been accompanied by greater demands for the local public authorities to present concrete 
programmes and proposals to the inhabitants on the substantive issues on the development of production and 
employment at the local level”. Increasingly, the demand for socio-economic development at the sub-national level is 
emerging as the most pressing need of local residents than any other function of local government authorities. 
However, the promotion of socio-economic development requires money. This has led to calls for fiscal or financial 
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decentralisation. Fiscal decentralisation is one of the different types of decentralisation practiced in many parts of the 
world. According to Robinson, (2003: 1) decentralisation encapsulates three distinct elements: 
• Financial decentralisation, entailing the transfer of financial resources in the form of grants and tax-raising 
powers to sub-national units of government; 
• Administrative decentralisation (sometimes referred to as de-concentration) where the functions performed 
by central government are transferred to geographically distinct administrative units, and, 
• Political decentralisation where powers and responsibilities are devolved to elected local government. 
Devolution entails all the above three elements identified by Robinson, but fiscal decentralisation is usually 
considered more important and difficult to pursue. Nonetheless, fiscal or financial decentralisation is necessary if the 
entire decentralisation process is to succeed or is to be sustained. According to van den Berg (2004: 33), “the success 
of decentralisation reforms hinges on the way fiscal decentralisation is designed and implemented”. In the view of 
Yilmaz et al (2008: 21) “a genuine spirit of decentralisation requires assigning a meaningful level of expenditure 
responsibilities to local governments with service autonomy so that they can respond to local needs”. Fiscal 
decentralisation according to Bardhan (1997: 54) “largely involves assignment of expenditures and revenues to 
lower-level governments”. Fiscal decentralisation is certainly the life-wire of the entire decentralisation process in all 
parts of the world. The essence of decentralisation is not only to improve political participation, but also to improve 
service delivery, and this requires money. In Ghana, fiscal decentralisation can be seen in two forms: the transfer of 
financial resources from the central government to the District Assemblies in the form of grants, and the 
empowerment of District Assemblies to mobilise revenue locally. This is intended to widen the scope of revenue to 
the District Assemblies to enable them effectively carry out their mandate. 
 
3.1 Decentralisation and Local Government in Ghana 
Decentralisation and local government administration is not a new phenomenon in Ghana. Ahwoi (2010: 3), the man 
who supervised the implementation of Ghana’s decentralisation programme in Ghana in 1988 as the 
Secretary/Minister of Local Government and Rural Development, notes that “local government in Ghana has from 
time immemorial been a part of the country’s way of life, its heritage and culture”. The traditional political system in 
Ghana, which revolves around local chiefs, is seen as a clear form of a decentralised local government system that 
has been practised long before the introduction of western political system of governance. The British colonial 
administrators and the various nationalist governments of Ghana also practiced various forms of decentralisation. 
Some of the British colonial administrators in Ghana even worked hand-in-hand with the traditional rulers in various 
parts of the country.  
However, though decentralisation and local government administration has existed in Ghana far too long, it was in 
1988 that a comprehensive policy to devolve power, authority and resources from the central government level to 
lower levels of government in Ghana was actually implemented. This decentralisation framework created a three-tier 
local government system comprising of Regional Coordinating Councils; Metropolitan, Municipal, and District 
Assemblies; and Town, Area, Zonal councils (Kunbuor, 2009; Ahwoi, 2010). This new decentralisation policy and 
accompanying legal framework created District, Municipal and Metropolitan Assemblies as the highest political 
authority at the lower level of government. The District Assemblies are the local government authorities in Ghana. 
Ahwoi (2010: 2) explains that “local authorities are those bodies that carry out the functions of local government”. 
The comprehensive decentralisation policy implemented in Ghana in 1988 clearly defined the roles and 
responsibilities to be performed by the District Assemblies. The specific functions of District Assemblies in Ghana 
as provided for in the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana include: 
• formulating and executing plans, programmes and strategies for the effective mobilisation and utilisation of 
human, physical and financial resources of the district; 
• promoting and supporting productive activity and social development in the district; 
• initiating programmes for the development of basic infrastructure; 
• developing, improving and managing human settlements and the environment; 
• coordinating, integrating and harmonising the execution of programmes and projects under approved 
development plans for the district and other development programmes promoted or carried out by ministries, 
departments, public corporations, other statutory bodies and NGOs in the district; 
• guiding, encouraging and supporting sub-district political bodies, public agencies and local communities to 
exercise their roles in the execution of approved development plans. 
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According to Diaw (1997: 6), “the overall processes of decentralization were aimed at restructuring the political and 
administrative machinery of government for development decision-making at both the national and local levels”. The 
new local government reforms policy in Ghana has the following features: 
• decentralisation of political and state power to enhance participatory democracy through local level political 
institutions with District Assemblies as the pivot; 
• decentralisation by devolution of administration, development planning, implementation and budgeting 
decision-making in which local level authorities will be actively involved; 
• establishment of a national development planning agency responsible for the integration of the overall 
planning process, the coordination of development planning activities of sectoral agencies at the national 
level, as well as sub-national agencies at the local level, (Diaw, 1997: 6). 
Ahwoi (2010: 46) notes that District Assemblies are constituted as the highest political authorities at the sub-national 
level with deliberative, legislative, executive and administrative powers”. The District Assemblies are also 
constituted into District Planning Authorities, responsible for planning and coordinating the overall development of 
the districts (Massing, 1994; Diaw, 1997; Kokor, 2001; Kunbuor, 2009; Ahwoi, 2010). By virtue of this legal 
mandate, District Assemblies have become the main actors of local development in Ghana. In recent times, District 
Assemblies could be seen involved in the provision of infrastructure such as the construction of school blocks and 
health facilities among other things. 
 
4. Sources of Revenue to the Asante Akim South District Assembly 
The sources of revenue to the Asante Akim South District Assembly can be broadly classified as external and 
internal sources. The external sources of revenue to the Assembly include central government transfers and donor 
funds for specific projects. The central government transfer that constitutes the major revenue component of District 
Assemblies in Ghana is the District Assemblies’ Common Fund (DACF). The setting up of the District Assemblies 
Common Fund is provided for by article 252 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana. Article 252 (2) states 
“subject to the provision of this constitution, parliament shall annually make provision for the allocation of not less 
than five per cent (5%) of the total revenues of Ghana to the District Assemblies for development; and the amount 
shall be paid into the District Assemblies Common Fund in quarterly instalments”. Further, article 252 (3) provides 
that this fund be shared among all the District Assemblies in the country using a formula approved by the parliament 
of the Republic of Ghana. The District Assemblies Common Fund has since been increased from 5% to 7.5%, Ahwoi 
(2010). Like all other districts in Ghana, grants constitute the main source of funding to the Asante Akim South 
District Assembly. As shown in Table 1, grants constituted 89.2% of the total revenue of the Asante Akim South 
District Assembly in 2005. During my interaction with some officials of the Assembly it became clear that the 
Asante Akim South District Assembly has been relying on the District Assemblies’ Common Fund (DACF) as its 
main source of revenue for local development. The District Assemblies’ Common Fund is being used to finance 
various kinds of developmental projects in the district. It is also being used to finance part of the day-to-day 
administration of the district. Aside the District Assemblies’ Common Fund, there are other forms of grants made 
available to the Assembly to finance specific projects. Over the years, the Asante Akim South District Assembly has 
received funds for projects such as the Community Based Rural Development Programme, the Community Water 
and Sanitation Project, and the EU/GOG Micro Projects among others. 
The Asante Akim South District Assembly derives its internally generated funds from investment and rent from the 
Assembly’s buildings, rates, licences, land, fees and fines, and unspecified sources, often classified as miscellaneous. 
Among these sources, lands as a revenue head has been the main contributor to the Assembly’s internally generated 
fund. As shown in Table 1 for instance, lands contributed a share of 3.6% of total revenue to the Asante Akim South 
District Assembly in 2005. This made lands the second highest contributor among all the heads/sources, and the 
highest internal revenue source in the Asante Akim South District Assembly in 2005. From this analysis, it clear that 
the Asante Akim South District Assembly has a wide range of sources from which it receives, and/or could mobilise 
revenue. In like manner, the Assembly also has a wide range of revenue to utilise. The extent to which the Assembly 
is able to put in place measures to effectively mobilise and utilise revenue thus constitutes the subject matter of 
revenue management in local government administration. 
 
4.1 Local Government Revenue Management and the Question of Accountability 
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The quest for fiscal or financial decentralisation would not make much sense if mechanisms are not put in place to 
ensure the effective and efficient management of the financial resources transferred to the local government 
authorities. This explains why the concept of accountability has been linked to fiscal or financial decentralisation. It 
is in view of this that Johnson (2001: 523) defines decentralisation as “meaningful authority devolved to local units 
of governance that are accessible and accountable to the local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights and liberty”.  
In fact, the notion of accountability is linked to the whole subject of decentralisation. As such, the idea of 
accountability is linked to both political and financial processes. According to Papenfuss and Schaefer (2010: 559) 
“accountability is derived from the line of argument that the electorate has a right to be informed on the activities and 
expenditure of resources by the executive and legislative”. Accountability is linked to the notion that people have the 
right to know or have something. Papenfuss and Schaefer (2010) identify three benchmarks of public accountability: 
access to information, the quality of information, and transparency. Sloan (2001) argues that financial accounting 
should not be limited to valuation alone, but must be extended to cover governmental roles of accounting as well. In 
the view of Piotrowski and Ryzin (2007), accountability is the core ingredient in any democratic governance system; 
and accountability in turn hinges on transparency. To this end Piotrowski and Ryzin (2007: 308) define 
governmental transparency as the ability to find out what is going on inside a public sector organization through 
avenues such as open meetings, access to records, the proactive posting of information on websites, whistle-blower 
protections, and even illegally leaked information”. Though these are key elements of transparency, transparency and 
accountability is best promoted when roles and responsibilities of key actors in the financial management chain are 
well known to all stakeholders. In other words, when roles and responsibilities of schedule officers are not known, it 
would be difficult to hold them accountable for negative actions or inactions. 
Revenue management at the district level in Ghana has basically been concerned with the mobilisation and utilisation 
of the revenues of the District Assemblies. As part of revenue management mechanisms, the anticipated revenues 
and expenditure of the District Assemblies are usually expressed in the form of a district budget. According to 
Ahwoi (2010: 183) “the District Budget is the financial expression of the Assembly’s development plan, which seeks 
to achieve a balance between many ends and scarce or limited resources”. Though the subject of transparency is 
central in ensuring accountability in the use of financial resources, it has not been a key issue in the management of 
District Assemblies’ revenue in Ghana. Aside the Internal Audit Department, nothing is being done to promote 
transparency and accountability in both the mobilisation and utilisation of the District Assemblies’ revenue. It is 
assumed that the existence of the audit unit would guarantee accountability in the management of the Assemblies’ 
revenues. As such, efforts to promote accountability in local government revenue management in Ghana have not 
gone beyond the issuance of annual financial reports. It thus appear that there is very little interest by stakeholders in 
knowing who does what in financial management within the local government set-up in Ghana. This is demonstrated 
in the survey intended to determine the level of knowledge of core staff and Assembly members of the Asante Akim 
South District on the financial responsibility chart of the Assembly. 
 
4.2 Financial Responsibility Charting 
The argument of this paper is premised on the belief that the ability of respondents to differentiate between the roles 
and responsibilities of core administrative staff in the Asante Akim South District is an essential step in ensuring 
accountability in the financial management chain. By exploring accountability mechanisms available to 
organizations, Brennan and Solomon (2008: 892) acknowledge the prevalence of “traditional mechanisms of 
accountability such as governance regulations, boards of directors, financial reporting and disclosure, audit 
committees, external audits and institutional investors”. Though these measures are important in financial 
management, the quest for transparency and accountability must go beyond these traditional mechanisms. As 
Brennan and Solomon (2008: 892) point out, the scope of accountability and transparency is being broadened and 
re-oriented “towards greater stakeholder inclusivity”. This notion of “stakeholder inclusivity” as a means of 
promoting accountability and transparency finds expression in the concept of financial responsibility charting.  
The concept of financial responsibility charting here refers to the ability of stakeholders to identify or match specific 
financial roles and responsibilities with the designated person or department with an organisation. Financial 
responsibility charting is thus a tool or technique that could be used to clarify roles and responsibilities within the 
financial management chain, thus eliminating role ambiguity and promoting communication among the actors in line 
of duty. Financial transparency and accountability is best promoted in an environment where all stakeholders know 
the stake of each other in the financial management process. As Korey (1988:12) points out “responsibility charting 
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offers organisational experts a dynamic yet flexible approach that assists them in analysing the functions, problems, 
decisions, and organisational structures within the complex strategic management process”. Knowledge of the role or 
responsibility of actors in the financial management chain is itself a monitoring tool that can be used to track 
performance. As Korey (1988) notes, responsibility charting could be useful in analysing the contributions of actors 
engaged in any work process. Sadly, stakeholders are seen not to be interested in knowing who does what in the 
financial management chain of the District Assembly. Yet, all stakeholders expect transparency and accountability in 
local government financial administration. 
The survey results show that some core staff/personnel do not even know the specific responsibilities of their 
colleagues within the District administration. Although all the core staff were able to tell who is responsible for 
certain duties like preparing financial statements and reports, keeping accounting records, preparation of periodic 
budget performance reports, and the preparation of an annual budget, they could not match certain activities with the 
right people. As shown in Table 2, as high as 60% of the core staff did not know that the District Finance Officer 
(DFO) is responsible for preparing weekly/monthly revenue generation reporting sheets. Similarly, 60% of the core 
staff as shown in Table 2 attributes the responsibility of maintaining an inventory of the Assembly’s tax/revenue to 
the Budget Officer (BO) instead of the District Finance Officer (DFO). The ignorance level of the core staff was 
even higher in certain activities. For instance as shown in Table 2, as high as 80% of the core staff did not know that 
it is the responsibility of the District Chief Executive (DCE) to evaluate and report on the District Assembly’s (DA) 
financial condition. When it also came to the responsibility of investing the available District Assembly’s (DA) funds, 
80% of the core staff again did not know that it is the task of the District Coordinating Director (DCD). 
Comparatively however, the survey results shown in Table 2 give the indication that the core staff/personnel have a 
fair knowledge of the roles and responsibilities in the financial management chain than the Assembly members in the 
District. Apart from knowing that it is the responsibility of the Budget Officer to prepare the annual budget of the 
District, not all the Assembly members knew the right schedule officers for the remaining listed financial tasks. As 
shown in Table 2, the Assembly Members knowledge of some of the responsibilities is considerably low. For 
instance, the survey results show that only 22% of the Assembly members know that it is the responsibility of the 
District Chief Executive (DCE) to evaluate and report on the financial condition of the District Assembly. In like 
manner, only 22% of the Assembly members are aware that it is the responsibility of the District Coordinating 
Director (DCD) to invest available funds of the District Assembly. With respect to the responsibility of authorising 
the use of a reserve fund for capital replacement, only 11% of the Assembly members know that it is the mandate of 
the District Coordinating Director. 
In Table 3, another set of roles or responsibilities are presented. Out of the nine roles presented, it is only in three 
areas that all the core staff/personnel were able to rightly identify the right schedule officers. These roles include the 
preparation and distribution of financial reports, approval of tax rates, fee structure, the annual budget and 
supplementary budget, and preparation of annual revenue and expenditure estimates. In the remaining six roles, the 
knowledge of the core staff regarding who are the responsible persons for those tasks can be described as fair. As 
shown in Table 3, at least 60% of the core staff/personnel know who is responsible for those tasks. 
Conversely, that of the Assembly members can be described as poor. The survey results presented in Table 3 show 
that some of the Assembly members did not even know that they were responsible for some of the tasks. For instance, 
as shown in Table 3, not all the Assembly members know that it is their (District Assembly/DA) responsibility to 
approve the spending limits or reduce planned activities for each given year. Similarly, some of the Assembly 
members did not know that it is their responsibility to approve tax rates, fee structure, the annual budget and 
supplementary budget of the Assembly. In addition, as shown in Table 3, 44% of the members did not know that it is 
their responsibility to authorise the contracting of loans. Furthermore, the survey results presented in Table 3, show 
that as high as 56% of the Assembly members did not know that it is their responsibility to determine priority areas 
for the investment of the District Assembly’s funds.  
 
4.3 Implications of Findings 
The revelation that some key roles or responsibilities of revenue management in the Asante Akim South District 
Assembly are not known by some of the core staff and Assembly members certainly has implications as far as 
transparency and accountability in financial management is concerned. First of all, it becomes difficult to hold people 
accountable when their roles or responsibilities in the financial management chain are not known. As Piotrowski and 
Ryzin (2007) point out, in situations where there is no knowledge or information on what people do, it becomes very 
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difficult to hold officials accountable for their actions or inactions. It is through responsibility charting that clarifies 
where ultimate responsibility for a particular task lies. Without knowing who is ultimately responsible for specific 
financial tasks, accountability hangs in a balance. Second, without role determination, they cannot be role 
expectation. This is so because without knowing peoples’ roles in the financial management chain, it would be 
difficult to have expectations on them. Alternatively, the lack of knowledge on the organisation’s financial 
responsibility chart could lead to a situation where people will attribute certain financial responsibilities to wrong 
people or departments. Third, in organisations where roles and responsibilities are not clearly known, blame game is 
employed in times of poor results. As Korey (1988: 12) points out “by designating who is to be responsible for 
performing an activity, who should supervise it, who ought to be consulted or notified with regard to that activity, 
and all the other special relationships that the individual undertaking the task must observe, responsibility charting 
eliminates work duplication and overlapping of responsibilities”. When roles and responsibilities are blurred, it leads 
to overlapping and blame game when things go bad. This blame game is often shifted from one person to another, 
unless someone comes out to accept responsibility. It is in light of this that Yilmaz, et al (2008) argue that local 
government accountability measures must seek to build the capacity of elected representatives in local government to 
enable them play an effective oversight role over local government financial administration.  Four, in organisations 
where roles and responsibilities of staff are not known, transparency would be shrouded in secrecy.  As Yilmaz et al 
(2008: 23) point out ´´clear assignments of roles and responsibilities is decisive in shaping accountability relations 
among various actors at the local level´´. Without answers to the question, who does what, transparency would 
remain a secret. But when roles and responsibilities are clarified, communication and team work are easily promoted.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The role of financial responsibility charting in promoting transparency and accountability in local government 
financial administration cannot be overemphasised. Knowledge of financial responsibility charting does only enable 
us to understand who does what, it also helps us to know who is accountable to who and for what in the financial 
management chain. Poor knowledge on financial responsibility charting or lack of interest in it is thus a barrier in the 
struggle for transparency and accountability in local government financial administration. Not until local government 
authorities, especially the elected representatives of the local residents show interest in knowing who is doing what 
in the financial management chain, the fight for transparency and accountability in local government administration 
would be a lost battle. There is thus the urgent need on the part of those advocating transparency and accountability 
to take steps to educate and whip up interest of Assembly members on financial responsibility charting to enable 
them have an appreciation of the financial responsibilities of the core staff in order to hold them accountable for their 
bad actions or inactions. This would also enable stakeholders to employ role monitoring to ensure that each core staff 
is performing his or her roles or responsibilities in the financial management chain. 
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Table 1: Sources of Revenue to the Asante Akim South District Assembly in 2005 
Revenue Heads Estimate  (GHS)  Actual (GHS) Percentage Share (%) 
Rates 158,973,991 115,058,000 1.7 
Lands 285,600,000 239,815,000 3.6 
Fees and Fines 243,972,000 220,343,800 3.3 
Licenses 161,550,000 95,752,000 1.5 
Rent 41,560,000 25,809,000 0.4 
Grants 10,272,825,808 5,870,827,877 89.2 
Investment 10,000,000 3,283,500 0.05 
Miscellaneous 20,050,000 10,767,148 0.2 
Total 11,194,531,799 6,581,656,325 100.00 
Source: Asante Akim South District Assembly 
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Table 2: Core staff and Assembly Members Level of Knowledge on Financial Responsibility Charting 
Source: Field Survey, 2009 
 
Responsibility   Responsible 
Officer/Unit 
Knowledge of Core Staff Knowledge of Assembly Members 
Prepare financial 
statements, schedules 
and reports 
District 
Finance 
Officer 
District Finance Officer -100% District Finance Officer -55.6% 
Budget Officer -33.3% 
Planning Officer-11.1% 
Keep general 
accounting records 
District 
Finance 
Officer 
District Finance Officer -100% District Finance Officer -89% 
Don’t Know-11% 
Prepare the annual 
budget document 
Budget Officer  Budget Officer-100% Budget Officer -100% 
Prepare periodic 
budget performance 
reports 
Budget Officer Budget Officer-100% Budget Officer -89% 
District Finance Officer  & Planning 
Officer-11% 
Prepare 
weekly/monthly 
revenue generation 
reporting sheets 
District 
Finance 
Officer 
District Finance Officer -40% 
Budget Officer -40% 
Internal Auditor &  Budget Officer 
-20% 
District Coordinating Director -22% 
District Finance Officer -56% 
Internal Auditor -11% 
Planning Officer-11% 
Maintain an inventory 
of Assembly’s 
tax/revenue base 
District 
Finance 
Officer 
District Finance Officer -40% 
Budget Officer -60% 
District Coordinating Director -11% 
District Finance Officer -67% 
Internal Auditor-22% 
Collect all monies due 
the Assembly 
District 
Finance 
Officer 
District Finance Officer -100% District Finance Officer -67% 
Budget Officer -11% 
District Chief Executive -22% 
Authorize use of a 
reserve fund for capital 
replacement 
District 
Coordinating 
Director 
District Finance Officer -100% District Assembly-34% 
District Coordinating Director -11% 
District Finance Officer -11% 
Budget Officer -22% 
District Chief Executive -22% 
Evaluate and report on 
DAs financial 
condition 
District Chief 
Executive 
District Coordinating Director -20% 
District Finance Officer -80% 
District Finance Officer -56% 
Budget Officer 22% 
District Chief Executive -22% 
Invest available DA 
funds 
District 
Coordinating 
Director 
District Assembly-20% 
District Coordinating Director -20% 
District Chief Executive-40% 
District Coordinating Director  & 
District Chief Executive -20% 
District Assembly-22% 
District Coordinating Director -22% 
District Finance Officer -34% 
District Chief Executive -22% 
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Table 3: Core staff and Assembly Members Level of Knowledge on Financial Responsibility Charting 
 Source: Field Survey, 2009 
 
Responsibility   Responsible 
Officer/Unit 
Knowledge of core staff Knowledge of Assembly members 
Prepare planned development 
project information sheet 
Planning 
Officer 
Budget Officer-20% 
Planning Officer-80% 
District Coordinating Director-11% 
Planning Officer-89% 
Approve the spending limits 
or reduce planned activities 
District 
Assembly 
District Assembly-40% 
District Coordinating Director-20% 
Budget Officer-20% 
District Chief Executive-20% 
District Assembly-33% 
Budget Officer-23% 
District Chief Executive-44% 
Prepare and distribute 
financial reports 
District Finance 
Officer 
District Finance Officer-100% District Coordinating Director-11% 
District Finance Officer-67% 
Budget Officer-11% 
Planning Officer-11% 
Approve tax rates, fee 
structures, the annual budget 
and supplementary budget 
District 
Assembly 
District Assembly-100% District Assembly-89% 
Internal Auditor-11% 
Prepare annual revenue and 
expenditure estimates 
Budget Officer Budget Officer-100% District Finance Officer-44% 
Budget Officer-44% 
Planning Officer-12% 
Monitor revenue collection 
performance 
District Finance 
Officer 
District Finance Officer-60% 
Internal Auditor-20% 
District Finance Officer &Budget 
Officer-20% 
District Coordinating Director-12% 
District Finance Officer-44% 
Internal Auditor-44% 
Authorise the contracting of 
loans 
District 
Assembly 
District Assembly-60% 
Planning Officer-20% 
Budget Officer and Planning 
Officer-20% 
District Assembly-56% 
 
District Chief Executive-33% 
Don’t Know-11% 
Determine priority areas for 
investment 
District 
Assembly 
District Assembly-60% 
Planning Officer-20% 
Budget Officer and Planning 
Officer-20% 
District Assembly-44% 
District Finance Officer-12% 
District Chief Executive-22% 
Planning Officer-22% 
Determine whether financial 
operations are proper 
Internal Auditor  District Assembly-20% 
District Finance Officer-20% 
Internal Auditor-60% 
District Assembly-22% 
District Coordinating Director-22% 
District Finance Officer-22% 
Internal Auditor-22% 
Budget Officer-12% 
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